Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2005

Neutralizing Grutter
Girardeau A. Spann
Georgetown University Law Center, spann@law.georgetown.edu

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-182

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/244
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175797

7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 633-668 (2005)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

NEUTRALIZING GRUTTER

Girardeau A. Spann·
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger upheld
the use of racial affirmative action as a means of increasing student
1
diversity at the University of Michigan Law School. But in doing so,
the Court also prohibited the use of racial quotas in affirmative action programs, finding the pursuit of racial balance to be a "patently
unconstitutional" governmental objective. 2 Gruttds prohibition on
racial balance is nominally rooted in a desire to promote colorblind
3
race neutrality in the culture's allocation of resources. But ironically,
it is the Supreme Court's aversion to racial balance itself that perpetuates contemporary racial discrimination.
For people who believe that the conscious pursuit of racial balance offers the only realistic hope of achieving a meaningful level of
racial equality in the United States, Grutter is disappointing. It is
4
reminiscent of earlier Supreme Court decisions, such as Dred Scott,
where the Court curiously chose to invalidate efforts by the political
branches to promote racial justice. There are a variety of ways in
which the political branches can resist the racial balance restriction
that Grutter imposes. They range from mild efforts to camouflage the
pursuit of racial balance, to more radical efforts that challenge the legitimacy of judicial review itself. However, the degree to which contemporary culture is willing to resist the Supreme Court's prohibition

©Girardeau A. Spann, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington,
D.C. I would like to thank Lisa Heinzerling and Steven Goldberg for their help in developing
the ideas expressed in this Article. Research for this Article was supported by a grant from the
Georgetown University Law Center.
1
See Gruner v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 336 (2003) (upholding an educational affirmative
action program that gave holistic and individualized consideration to applicants); cf Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-76 (2003) (invalidating an educational affirmative action program
that awarded a specified number of points to minority applicants as too mechanical to be narrowly tailored).
2
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
' See id. at 326--27 (asserting preference for race neutrality, and applying strict scrutiny to all
racial classifications, including benign affirmative action classifications).
4
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857) (invalidating a congressional statute prohibiting slavery in the Louisiana Territory).
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on achieving racial balance will be a direct function of the degree to
which the culture is committed to the principle of racial equality.
Part I of this Article argues that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional competence to formulate racial policy for the nation, and
highlights the tension that exists between the Court's abstract preference for race neutrality and the concrete reality of contemporary
race relations, in which dedicated efforts to promote racial balance
offer the only meaningful hope of eliminating systemic discrimination. Part II discusses moderate strategies that can be used to
deflect the impact of Gruttds prohibition on racial balance, suggesting that racial balancing can be restructured in ways that the Supreme Court may view as constitutional. Part III discusses more radical strategies that can be used to promote racial balance, and
advocates a direct confrontation with the institution of judicial review
in the context of affirmative action. The Article concludes that the
political branches of government possess the power to overcome Supreme Court impediments to racial justice, and hopes that they also
possess the will to exercise that power.
I. RACIAL POLICY

The Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decision in Grutter
v. Bollinger insists that efforts to achieve racial balance are unconstitutional.6 However, it is far from clear that the Supreme Court should
be viewed as having the institutional competence to make such a determination. Moreover, even if one concedes to the Court the power
to formulate affirmative action policy, the Court's racial balance prohibition still seems wrong on the merits. The current Court is preoccupied with the concept of race neutrality, but the nature of contemporary racial discrimination is such that only explicit efforts to
achieve racial balance seem likely to promote racial equality.
A. Institutional Competence
Grutter is premised on the belief that the political branches of government must ask the Supreme Court for permission to solve the
longstanding problem of racial discrimination in the United States.
That is a curious premise for at least three reasons. First, the institution of judicial review cannot plausibly be understood to give the Supreme Court the countermajoritarian power to formulate racial policy in a democratic society. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment

5

539 U.S. at 306.
See id. at 330 (stating that the use of racial quotas "would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional.").
6
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gives Congress-not the Supreme Court-the power to remedy discrimination against racial minorities, thereby making it anomalous
for the Supreme Court to invalidate mcyoritarian affirmative action
programs on the grounds that the Court knows better than the political branches what will satisfY the equal protection demands of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the Supreme Court has such a dismal record in the protection of racial minority rights that it is difficult
to see why anyone with a genuine interest in promoting racial justice
would believe that the Court could do a better job than the political
branches in protecting minority rights.
The existence of judicial review in a democratic society has always
been problematic. It poses the countermajoritarian danger that unelected judges, who are intentionally insulated from political accountability, will have the ability to formulate social policy in ways
that trump the policy preferences of the representative branches of
7
government. Although the constitutional legitimacy of judicial review is now widely accepted, it is difficult to imagine that the Framers
envisioned anything like the role that the Supreme Court has come
to play in the debate over controversial social issues such as abortion,
8
school prayer, and affirmative action. A species of judicial review
that limited Supreme Court involvement in the political process to
the enforcement of determinate norms that were clearly expressed in
the Constitution could perhaps be reconciled with the process of
9
democratic self governance. However, it is difficult to deem democratic the Supreme Court's substitution of judicial policy preferences
for political policy preferences in the interpretation of constitutional
norms that are inherently political in nature.

7

See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 35-45 (4th ed. 2001) (discussing the countermajoritarian difficulty posed by judicial review). The Constitution attempts
to insulate the Supreme Court from political influence through the devices of life tenure and
salary protection. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (declaring that "[t]he Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office."). See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAJNST THE COURT: THE
SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14-15 (1993) [hereinafter RACE
AGAJNST THE COURT] (discussing formal safeguards for Supreme Court independence).
8

In asserting the power of judicial review, ChiefJusticeJohn Marshall recognized the difficulty inherent in allowing the Supreme Court to resolve innately political questions. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that "[t]he province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or
which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.").
9

See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62-63 (1936) (describing the mechanical process of judicial review); see also STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 35-39 (discussing mechanical interpretations of the Constitution as a response to the countermajoritarian difficulty).
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The Constitution, of course, says nothing about affirmative action,
and the Supreme Court's only constitutional basis for regulating the
content of affirmative action programs stems from the Equal Protec10
tion Clause. But it is hard to find in the phrase "equal protection"
any justification for Supreme Court invalidation of affirmative action
burdens that the political majority has chosen to impose upon itself
to "equalize" the status of those racial minorities whom American culture has historically treated as inferior. One could, of course, vigorously dispute what it takes to promote racial "equality" in contemporary culture. However, it is difficult to see why the Supreme Court
should be viewed as institutionally more competent than the political
branches of government to resolve that dispute. 11
Things get worse when one remembers that the equal protection
guarantee used by the Supreme Court as the basis for regulating af12
firmative action is contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to authorize the Supreme
Court to formulate racial policy. Rather, it was adopted in order to
authorize Congress to enhance the status of racial minorities, and to
protect such congressional "affirmative action" from Supreme Court
invalidation. Mter the Civil War, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, which was designed to end discrimination against former
black slaves in places of public accommodation. However, federalism
doubts about the constitutionality of the Act prompted adoption of

10

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). The Supreme Court has held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment also contains a tacit equal protection component that applies to
the federal government. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (finding a tacit
equal protection safeguard in the Fifth Amendment).
11

For a more extended argument against judicial review in the context of racial discrimination, see RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7. Other scholars have presented general arguments questioning the scope and desirability of judicial review. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REAsONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4-5 (1996) (favoring "incompletely theorized agreements" over comprehensive or definitive judicial resolutions of controversial political issues);
CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CAsE AT A TIME: jUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)
(favoring narrow Supreme Court decisions that permit democratic reflection by the elected
branches); MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (disfavoring judicial review); see also Robert P. George, Law, Democracy, and Moral Disagreement, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1399-1400 (1997) (reviewing AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT: WHY MORAL CONFLICT CANNOT BE AVOIDED IN POLITICS, AND
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1996) and CAss R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REAsONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT ( 1996), and favoring political over judicial resolutions of morally charged
political conflicts); Michael]. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 414 (1997) (arguing,
as a positive matter, that judicial review often entails mere deference to majoritarian political
preferences). But see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359, 1362 (1997) (favoring judicial supremacy in constitutional
interpretation to be binding on other branches of government).
12

See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003) (stating that affirmative action
programs have to comply with the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contained the substantive equal protection guarantee, 13 and
Section 5 authorized Congress to enforce the provisions of Section 114
precisely so that the Supreme Court would not invalidate such remedial efforts on constitutional grounds. The Fourteenth Amendment,
therefore, was designed to authorize political remedies for racial discrimination, and to give federal remedies primacy over state "Black
Codes" that had officially legislated the inferiority of blacks. 15 Nothing in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment can plausibly be
read to authorize the Supreme Court to invalidate state or federal political enactments that are designed to enhance the status of racial minorities. Rather, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes
that questions about the policy prudence and the constitutional validity of affirmative action are questions that, in Marbury terms, are "in
their nature political." 16
When the majority, acting through the political branches of government, chooses to impose a burden on itself in order to advance its
understanding of racial equality, there is no basis for invoking the
heightened judicial scrutiny that the Court typically reserves for cases
involving suspect governmental motives. In representation-reinforcement terms, there is no reason to fear that the majoritarian political
process is seeking to disadvantage a discrete-and-insular minority
group that is unable to protect its own interests in the pluralist politi17
cal process. The Supreme Court asserts thatjudicial intervention in
the affirmative action debate is needed to protect the individual
equal protection rights of whites who are burdened by affirmative action.18 But that merely begs the question. Whites burdened by affirmative action are not unconstitutionally discriminated against any
more than methadone users who are denied municipal employment
because of their participation in drug treatment programs. But the
1
'

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 1 (guaranteeing equal protection to all individuals).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). The other Reconstruction Amendments had
similar provisions authorizing Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, to enforce their substantive guarantees. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2 (authorizing Congress to enforce the
prohibition against involuntary servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XV,§ 2 (authorizing Congress
to enforce the right to vote without abridgment on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude).
15
See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 431-33 (discussing the history of the Reconstruction
Amendments).
16
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
17
For the prevailing account of how government policymakers can discount the interests of
discrete-and-insular minorities, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
jUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
18
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause
protects persons rather than groups) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peila, 515 U.S.
200,227 (1995)).
14
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Supreme Court defers to the value judgments made by the political
branches in the methadone case, while strictly scrutinizing the value
judgments made by the political branches in affirmative action
19
cases. This is true even though methadone users, who are likely to
be both poor and members of racial minority groups, 20 would seem to
present a much stronger claim to discrete-and-insular minority status
than members of the white m,Yority who are burdened by an affirmative action program. If there is any justification for this differential
treatment, it must be based on the belief that there is something special about racial affirmative action classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause that warrants heightened judicial scrutiny. But as
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes, the value judgments entailed in adopting an affirmative action program are more
amenable to legislative balancing in the representative political process than to politically unaccountable judicial balancing in the guise of
interpreting the words "equal protection." For better or worse, judicial review is now understood to authorize the Court to enforce the
Equal Protection Clause. However, because of the complex and intractable policy judgments at issue, the substantive content of the
Equal Protection Clause can defensibly be derived only from the representative political process. The Fourteenth Amendment does not
itself provide any non-political definition of "equality," or any judicially manageable standards for deriving such a definition.
My claim that the Supreme Court lacks the institutional competence to formulate racial policy under the Equal Protection Clause is
borne out by the history of Supreme Court adjudications in race
cases. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated "affirmative action" programs that the majoritarian branches of government have
adopted to advance the interests of racial minorities, even though
there is no apparent reason for the Court to have done so. Dred Scott
provides the most obvious example. In an effort to provide a legislative solution to the increasingly contentious issue of slavery in new
United States Territories, Congress passed the Missouri Compromise
Act of 1854. The Supreme Court, however, invalidated that political
compromise in Dred Scott, and in the process, held that blacks were

19

Compare New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1979) (applying
minimal equal protection scrutiny to a rule prohibiting the employment of even qualified
methadone users), with Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223--27 (applying strict equal protection scrutiny to
a minority set-aside program adopted by Congress for federally-funded construction projects).
20
Beazer, 440 U.S. at 609 n.15 (White,]., dissenting) ("Heroin addiction is a special problem
of the poor, and the addict population is composed largely of racial minorities ... .").
21
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating a congressional statute
prohibiting the holding of slaves in the territory of the Louisiana Purchase north of 36 deg. 30
min. north latitude).

Feb.2005]

NEUTRALIZING GRUTTER

639

not "citizens" within the meaning of the United States Constitution. 22
By so constitutionalizing the inferior status of blacks, the Court precluded the possibility of future political solutions to the problem of
slavery. Because it left opponents of slavery with no other political
recourse, Dred Scott is now widely viewed as a disastrous decision that
both precipitated the Civil War, and created the need for the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution. 23
If there is a lesson in Dred Scott about the perils inherent in the politically unaccountable judicial formulation of racial policy, the Supreme Court has not yet learned it. The Court has continued to invalidate affirmative action programs adopted by the political
branches whenever those programs do not comport with the Court's
own conception of sound racial policy. The Court invalidated an affirmative action program for minority medical students in its 1978
24
Bakke decision and a municipal set-aside plan for minority contrac25
tors in its 1989 Croson decision. And it applied what, prior to Grutter,
had always been fatal strict scrutiny to a similar federal set-aside plan
26
in its 1995 Adarand decision. Moreover, in its 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision,27 the Court applied strict scrutiny to a North Carolina maJorityminority redistricting plan that had been created to comply with the
federal Voting Rights Act by increasing minority political representation in Congress. The Court then went on to use Shaw v. Reno as a
basis for invalidating a number of majority-minority redistricting
plans. It invalidated a Georgia plan in its 1995 Miller v. johnson decision.28 It invalidated the Shaw v. Reno North Carolina plan after remand in its 1996 Shaw v. Hunt decision, 29 and invalidated a Texas
30
plan in its 1996 Bush v. Vera decision. The Court also invalidated a
Justice Department directive to create an additional Georgia majority31
minority district in its 1997 Abrams v. johnson decision.
32
Although Brown v. Board of Education is typically said to establish
the Supreme Court's capacity to remedy racial oppression, even
Brown does more to illustrate the problems entailed in Supreme
22

See id. at 404-27 (holding that blacks were not included in the constitutional term "citizens").
23
See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 429-33 (discussing Dred Scott and its aftermath).
24
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
25
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
26
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 (1995).
27
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 ( 1993).
28
Millerv.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
29
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
"'Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
"Abramsv.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
82
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (Brown I) (invalidating separate-butequal public school segregation); see aLw Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown
II) (requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed").
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Court racial policymaking than it does to answer them. Brown is said
to have desegregated the public schools, and to have ended the government's use of racial classifications. But Brown did neither. The
limited school desegregation that did occur was largely the result of
actions taken by the political branches. 33 And, as the racial profiling
that has followed the September 11 terrorist attacks so clearly illustrates, Brown hardly ended the government's use of racial classifications.34
This is not to say that the Supreme Court always rules against racial minority interests. The Court ufsheld voluntary affirmative action
plans in its 1980 Fullilove decision, 5 and its 1990 Metro Broadcasting
36
decision -although Metro Broadcasting was overruled by the Court
five years later in Adarand. 31 The Court also rejected yet another challenge to a North Carolina majority-minority redistricting plan in its
38
2001 Easley v. Cromartie decision, finding that the plan was motivated
39
by political rather than racial considerations. The problem is not
that the Supreme Court always invalidates affirmative action programs. Rather, the problem is that the Court thinks it can tell the difference between an affirmative action program that is constitutional
and one that is unconstitutional.

33

See RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7, at 104-10 (discussing failure of Brown to desegregate schools or end governmental use of racial classifications).
,. For examples of commentators noting the similarity between post-September 11 racial
profiling and the treatment of Japanese American citizens during World War II, see Plight of the
Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention ofDeportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1915, 1930-39 (2002) and
Liam Braber, Note, Korematsu 's Ghost: A Post-September lith Analysis of Race and National Security,
47 VILL. L. REv. 451 (2002). See a£50 Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9
AsiAN LJ. 195, 197-200 (2002) (discussing how to apply lessons from the Japanese internment
to racial profiling post-September 11); Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV.
INT'L LJ. 23, 33-39 (2002) (arguing that the September 11 attacks have begun to warp the balance between national security and civil liberties, as did World War II); Lori Sachs, Comment,
September 11, 2001: The Constitution During Crisis: A New Perspective, 29 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 1715,
1728-43 (2002) (discussing the role of the Supreme Court in World War II); Huong Vu, Note,
Us Against Them: The Path to National Security is Paved f?y Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 661, 665-76,
691-93 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. Government and mainstream society have been willing to
scapegoat racial minorities after national tragedies); Michael]. Whidden, Note, Unequaljustice:
Arabs in America and United States Antitemnism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825, 2825-30,
2836-41 (2002) (arguing that modem terrorism legislation repeats the American habit of targeting and stigmatizing immigrant groups and racial minorities).
" Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
86
Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
" Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 225-27 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcastings use of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny).
38
Easleyv. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
39
See id. at 257-58 (reversing the lower court's finding of racial motivation). For a fuller
discussion of the Supreme Court's affirmative action decisions, see GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE
LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TwEN"IY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
REMEDIES (2000) [hereinafter THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION).
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Any affirmative action program that the white majority voluntarily
adopts through the political process should be upheld under the
Constitution because there is no reason to distrust the political process with respect to benign affirmative action. But that is precisely the
argument that the Supreme Court rejected in Adarand, holding that
even benign affirmative action was subject to strict equal protection
scrutiny. 40 The value judgments that are entailed in deciding whether
affirmative action constitutes sound social policy are far too subtle
and delicate to be entrusted to an institution whose credentials for
41
42
racial grudence and sensitivity include Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu. That is a recipe for permitting the racial policy of the nation
to be determined not merely by the values of nine unaccountable
people in black robes, but often by the policy preferences of one Justice who happens at any particular point in time to have the swing
44
vote on the issue of affirmative action. Allowing the Supreme Court
to have the final say in the formulation of the nation's affirmative action policy raises the danger that racial minority rights will continue
to be sacrificed in the name of racial equality, as they have been so
45
sacrificed during most of the nation's history.
Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court's racial balance decision in Grutter illustrates this
problem.
B. Racial Balance
Grutter tends to be viewed as a case that is beneficial to racial minorities because it upholds the use of racial affirmative action in an
educational context, and holds that diversity can constitute a compel-

40

Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-27; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (citing
Adarand to support the position that benign affirmative action is subject to strict scrutiny).
41
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 397 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be
citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution).
42
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segregation).
43
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding World War II military exclusion order directed at persons ofJapanese ancestry).
44
Many contemporary Supreme Court affirmative action cases have been 5-4 decisions, with
Justice O'Connor acting as the swing vote. See THE lAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39,
at 159-61 (discussing affirmative action voting blocs on the Supreme Court). Indeed, the reason that the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the affirmative action program at issue in Grutter
was that justice O'Connor, for the first time, switched sides and voted in favor of upholding a
racial affirmative action program on the merits. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; see also THE lAW OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, at 160 n.57 (enumerating the affirmative action voting record of justice O'Connor).
45
For an extended argument that the social function of the Supreme Court has historically
been to subordinate the interests of racial minorities to the interests of the white majority see
RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7.
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46

ling state interest for purposes of strict scrutiny. However, Gruttcr is
likely to do more harm than good for minority interests, because it
emphatically insists that the pursuit of racial balance as gart of an affirmative action program is "patently unconstitutional." By outlawing the pursuit of racial balance in the name of colorblind race neutrality, Gruttcr prohibits the only remedy that is likely to be effective in
combating contemporary racial discrimination.
Gruttcr evidences a clear Supreme Court preference for race-neutral over race-conscious efforts to ameliorate the plight of racial minorities. Race-neutral affirmative action is subject to only rational basis review, but race-conscious affirmative action is subject to strict
48
equal protection scrutiny. Although the economic, political, and social disadvantages suffered by contemporary racial minorities are
traceable to a long history of race-conscious discrimination, the Supreme Court believes that its asymmetrical preference for raceneutral responses to race-conscious discrimination is justified by the
49
need to prevent future race-based discrimination. As a result, the
Court has largely limited the use of race-conscious remedies to those
instances in which race-neutral remedies have been shown to be inadequate.50
The Court's preference for race-neutrality has caused it to be hos51
tile to racial quotas and other efforts to achieve racial balance. The
Court views the pursuit of racial balance as an effort to remedy what
52
it terms general "societal discrimination." According to the Court,
the problem with attempting to remedy societal discrimination is that
it will necessarily result in vast remedial programs that impose impermissible burdens on innocent contemporary whites, who were not
themselves the perpetrators of the long history of discrimination
against racial minorities. 53 Therefore, the Court has consistently limited the use of race-conscious affirmative action to situations in which
46

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328-33 ("Today we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body.")
47
Id. at 308.
48
See id. at 326--27 (applying strict scrutiny to even benign affirmative action); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, 515 U.S. 200, 223-27 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to a benign affirmative action program).
49
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-30 (applying strict scrutiny to even benign racial classifications in order to protect the individual right to be free from racial discrimination).
50
See id. at 237-38 (suggesting that strict scrutiny requires lack of race-neutral alternatives);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989) (rejecting affirmative action program because, inter alia, there was no evidence that the city council had considered race neutral alternatives). But see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (stating that narrow tailoring does not necessarily require lack of race-neutral alternatives).
51
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (finding the pursuit of racial balance to be "patently unconstitutional").
52
See id. at 323 (prohibiting remedies for general "societal discrimination").
53
I d. at 323 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978)).
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narrowly-tailored remedies are used to address particularized acts of
54
discrimination.
There are two problems with the Supreme Court's aversion to the
pursuit of racial balance as a remedy for general societal discrimination. First, the argument is internally inconsistent in its effort to distinguish between individual and group injuries. Second, the argument is based on a faulty understanding of the nature of
contemporary racial discrimination. Once those two problems are
recognized, only a desire to discount the interests of racial minorities
can justify continued Supreme Court hostility to the goal of achieving
racial balance.
The Supreme Court's view is that racial balance remedies for general societal discrimination are unconstitutional because they impose
55
.excessive burdens on whites.
In its unadorned version, that argument is discriminatory on its face. For most of the nation's history,
racial imbalance was perfectly constitutional when it was used to
benefit whites, but racial balance is now unconstitutional when it is
used to benefit racial minorities in an effort to equalize matters. The
Supreme Court has attempted to sidestep this facial discrimination by
embellishing its racial balance prohibition. It argues that the Equal
Protection Clause protects individuals and not groups. 56 Therefore,
54

Justice Powell articulated this position in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307-10, and reasserted it in
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-79 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Led
by Justice O'Connor, this view has now been adopted by a majority of the Court. See Grutter, 539
U.S. at 323 (citing Bakke as rejecting interest in remedying societal discrimination); id. at 330
(rejecting racial balancing as "patently unconstitutional"); see also Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed.
Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990) (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (stating that
"an interest in remedying societal discrimination cannot be considered compelling"); Croson,
488 U.S. at 496-98 (O'Connor,]., plurality opinion) (stating "'societal discrimination' ... is an
inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications"); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
647-53 (1987) (O'Connor,]., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting societal discrimination);
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor,]., concurring) ("'[S]ocietal' discrimination, that is, discrimination not traceable to [an agency's] own actions, cannot be deemed sufficiently compelling to pass constitutional muster .... "). In Grutter, a majority of the Supreme Court for the
first time held that promoting prospective racial diversity in an educational context could constitute a compelling governmental interest, but the Court reaffirmed its prohibition on the use
of racial balance to remedy general societal discrimination. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
55
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310) (noting that remedying societal
discrimination risks "placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties 'who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought
to have suffered.'").
56
See id. at 323 (asserting that the Equal Protection Clause safeguards individual rights
rather than group rights). There has been a longstanding debate concerning whether the
Equal Protection Clause is properly understood as protecting individual rights or group rights.
Compare Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination
Principk, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 48-52 (1976) (arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as individual phenomena) and Michael J. Perry, The
Principle of Equal Protection, 32 HAsTINGS LJ. 1133, 1145-48 (1981) ("[T]he group-centered conception creates [tension] with our individual-centered constitutional jurisprudence"), with
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the Equal Protection Clause permits only remedies for particularized
acts of discrimination, and not for the systemic societal discrimina57
tion to which racial balance remedies are directed. The premise of
this argument is, of course, wrong. As has been noted, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted specifically to authorize legislative remedies for discrimination against the
group of newly freed black slaves, and legislative remedies are by their
. 58
nature group reme d 1es.
In addition to its faulty premise, the Supreme Court's racial balance prohibition is also internally inconsistent. It first assumes that
the burdens imposed on whites as a result of affirmative action are
individual injuries, and that they can therefore be redressed without
violating the Equal Protection Clause. It then assumes that the burdens imposed on racial minorities as a result of societal discrimination are group injuries, and that they cannot therefore be redressed
without violating the Equal Protection Clause. However, the two injuries are precisely the same. Both result from a determination made
by a governmental institution to sacrifice the interests of one racial
group in order to advance the interests of another racial group. And
whatever it is about the injury to whites that makes racial balance
remedies unconstitutional would certainly seem to apply to the injury
to racial minorities that results from the refusal to allow racial balance remedies. The only difference between the two is the race of
the group that is being harmed. And despite the Supreme Court's
contrary suggestion, it simply cannot be true that the Equal Protection Clause permits the continued sacrifice of racial minority interests
in order to advance the interests of whites.
Aside from being logically problematic, the Supreme Court's prohibition on the use of racial balance to remedy general societal discrimination is based on a misunderstanding of the manner in which
contemporary racial discrimination operates. The Court reads the
Equal Protection Clause as something that is addressed to particularized injuries resulting from identifiable acts of invidious racial discrimination. Although such particularized discrimination of course
continues to exist, the truly troubling aspect of contemporary racial
discrimination is statistical in nature. Justice Ginsburg's dissenting
opinion in Gratz v. Bollingef9-in which the Supreme Court invalidated the University of Michigan's undergraduate affirmative action
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107, 147-77 (1976)
(arguing that discrimination, and consequently discrimination remedies, should be viewed as
group phenomena).
57
See cases cited supra note 54.
58
See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
59
539 u.s. 244 (2003).
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program despite upholding Michigan Law School's affirmative action
60
program the same day in Grutter -offers a striking statistical demonstration of the ways in which racial minorities continue to be underrepresented in the allocation of significant societal resources. 61 Because the criteria that we use to distribute societal resources have
been shaped by centuries of racial prejudice, it is not surprising that
those criteria continue systematically to disadvantage racial minorities
in ways that benefit the white majority. From standardized tests, to
union memberships, to housing patterns, to voting districts, our resource allocation criteria continue to reflect the racial attitudes that
have been firmly internalized by the culture at large. Moreover, the
racial skews embedded in those criteria now often operate in ways
62
that are largely unconscious. As a result, mere conscious efforts to
guard against our unconscious prejudices are likely to be ineffective
safeguards in most cases. All of this suggests that only dedicated efforts to achieve racial balance are likely to neutralize the culture's
natural propensity to allocate resources in a racially discriminatory
way. To the extent that the Supreme Court holds such racial balance
efforts to be unconstitutional, the Court is reading the Constitution
to require continued discrimination in the allocation of resources.
The Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing, and its concomitant indifference to general societal discrimination, seem to reflect a belief that prospective race neutrality is largelr adequate to sat6
isfY the demands of the Equal Protection Clause.
However, that
belief reduces the concept of racial equality to a theoretical abstraction having very little to do with the concrete discrimination that continues to disadvantage racial minorities in everyday life. If you are
not a member of a racial minority group, and you doubt the severity
of the societal disadvantages that racial minorities are forced to endure in contemporary culture, ask yourself whether you would be
willing to give up your white majority status and become a member of
a racial minority group. Similarly, if you are inclined to oppose affirmative action because you believe that racial minorities are unfairly
advantaged by racial preferences, ask yourself whether you would be
60

539 U.S. at 306.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-300 nn.1-3 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting).
62
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Jd, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 318-44 (1987) (arguing that much contemporary racial discrimination is unconscious).
·
6
' This view is reflected in the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari to review the
Ninth Circuit's decision upholding California's Proposition 209, which explicitly prohibited
race and gender affirmative action for the purpose of promoting prospective race and gender
neutrality. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) ("As a matter of 'conventional' equal protection analysis, there is simply no doubt that Proposition 209 is constitutional."); see also Girardeau A. Spann, Proposition
209, 47 DUKE LJ. 187 (1997) (discussing Proposition 209litigation further).
61
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willing to give up your white majority status in order to take advantage of a racial affirmative action program. I predict that you would
not be willing to relinquish your white majority status-precisely because you understand, with every fiber of your being, that the culture
continues to discriminate against racial minorities in a myriad of subde yet pervasive ways.
The policy issues surrounding the use of affirmative action to help
eliminate the racial underclass that has always been present in the
United States are obviously quite complicated. The notion that the
Supreme Court could eliminate the normative complexities entailed
in the affirmative action debate simply by insisting on a prospective
commitment to colorblind race neutrality is at best sophomoric.
Once one recognizes the problems inherent in both the Supreme
Court's prohibition on racial balance and its aversion to remedies for
general societal discrimination, it is difficult to find a normatively defensible justification for the Court's position. It seems obvious that
the Court lacks the relative institutional competence to substitute its
policy preferences for the preferences of the political branches of
government when the political branches decide to adopt affirmative
action programs that promote racial balance. It is almost as if the
Supreme Court were intent on reprising the racial callousness of
64
65
66
cases like Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu, so that it could continue
to discount the interests of racial minorities for the benefit of the
67
white majority.

II.

CREATIVE COMPLIANCE

The meaning of an imprecise constitutional term such as "equal
protection" is obviously contestable. That raises the question of how
one should properly respond when one disagrees with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a constitutional provision. The position of
68
the Supreme Court on this issue is clear. In Cooper v. Aaron, the
Court announced that it has the final say over the meaning of the
Constitution. 59 But, since the Court's assertion is itself an interpreta64

See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (I9 How.) 397 (I857) (holding that blacks could not
be citizens within the meaning of the United States Constitution).
65
See Plessy v. Ferguson, I63 U.S. 537 (I896) (upholding separate-but-equal racial segregation).
66
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 2I4 (1944) (upholding World War II military exclusion order directed at japanese-American citizens).
67
This conclusion is the primary thesis of RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7.
68
358 U.S. I (I958).
69
Id. at I8 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I37, I77 (I803)). The Cooper
Court stated that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." Cooper, 358 U.S. at I8.
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tion of the Constitution, Cooper simply generates a self-referential
paradox that is utterly unhelpful. If one believes that the meaning of
a constitutional provision is delegated by the Constitution to the political branches of government, then Cooper is not only wrong, but political deference to Cooper would itself be unconstitutional, as it would
violate the doctrine of separation of powers by vesting policymaking
power in the wrong branch of government. Arguably, the uncertainty
that exists concerning which branch of government possesses ultimate expository power under the Constitution is a good thing. It may
prompt continuous inter-branch negotiations over contentious issues
of social policy in a way that facilitates proper operation of our system
70
of checks and balances. If one shares that view, one is likely to favor
"creative compliance" with the Court's prohibition on racial balancing. Creative compliance will enable the political branches to secure
some of the benefits of racial balance, through the use of proxies and
camouflage techniques, without directly confronting the Supreme
Court's assertion of power over the political branches through the institution of judicial review. The use of proxies and camouflage by the
representative branches will also provide feedback to the Court concerning the political viability of its constitutional pronouncements,
thereby enabling the Court to factor that feedback into its future constitutional expositions.

A. Proxies
The most obvious way in which the political branches of government could comply with the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial
balancing, while still seeking to secure at least some of the benefits of
racial balance, is to implement affirmative action plans that use raceneutral factors as proxies for race. This strategy seems ironically appropriate because much of the contemporary racial discrimination
that affirmative action is designed to counteract also operates
through the use of proxies. In the past, American culture used explicit racial discrimination to exclude racial minorities from U.S. soil,
from desirable education, from desirable employment, from desirable housing, and from exercising political J?ower. Minorities were
barred from immigrating to the United States 1 and from holding cer-

70

This, in part, is the thesis of a book by Louis Michael Seidman about judicial review. See
LoUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION:
A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND jUDICIAL REVIEW (2001) (arguing against any final judicial resolution
of open constitutional questions).
71
See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 509-10 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the Chinese Exclusion. laws which prohibited the immigration and re-immigration of
Chinese persons and included the 1902 statute which permanently banned Chinese entry).
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tainjobs. Minorities were prohibited from being educated, or were
74
educated in segregated schools. They were prohibited from living
75
76
in certain neighborhoods and from voting. As the statistics cited in
Justice Ginsburg's Gratz dissent illustrate, American culture still discriminates against racial minorities in many areas." However, in the
post civil rights era where the option of de jure racial discrimination
78
has been restricted, de facto racial discrimination tends to be implemented through the use of proxies that correlate with race. Contemporary minorities are kept out of predominantly white schools

72

See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, "Rather Than the Free": Ji'ree Blacks in
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 43 (1991) (discussing Virginia
laws that effectively prevented blacks from practicing professions such as teaching and law by
forbidding free blacks to congregate); Timothy Sandefur, Can You Get Therefrom Here?: Hrrw the
Law Still Threatens King's Dream, 22 LAw & INEQ. 1, 13-15 (2004) (discussing statutory and regulatory restrictions that prohibited blacks from practicing law, and from becoming plumbers and
barbers).
·
73
See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SlAVES MADE 56166 (Vintage Books 1976) (1972) (discussing legal prohibitions on educating slaves as demonstrated by laws outlawing the sale of writing materials to slaves and the Catholic Church's historical denial of the scriptures to the "ignorant and impressionable").
74
See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating the "separate-but-equal" doctrine used to justify segregation in public schools); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)
(requiring desegregation of public schools "with all deliberate speed").
75
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 2~23 (1948) (reversing state court enforcement
of racially restrictive covenant in the sale of residential real property); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (reversing state court enforcement of laws requiring residential racial segregation).
76
For example, the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted in
1870 to eliminate the widespread disenfranchisement of blacks that existed prior to the Civil
War. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (holding that the right to vote cannot be abridged on account
of race). Even after adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment, however, blacks were effectively
disenfranchised in many states by devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and voting districts
which diluted minority voting strength. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was intended to address
this de facto disenfranchisement. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:
The Transformation of Voting Rights jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1838-53 (1992) (discussing the purposes and history of the Voting Rights Act, and attempts over the years to thwart
these purposes).
77
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 298-302 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing
statistical disadvantages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in areas including education, employment, and housing); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 938 (1995) (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) (noting that Georgia did not send a post-Reconstruction black to Congress
until1972, seven years after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior to a redistricting plan
adopted in response to the 1990 Census, North Carolina had not sent a black representative to
Congress since the Reconstruction).
.
78
In overruling the separate-but-equal regime of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896),
Brown I is typically understood to have prohibited most governmental uses of racial classifications. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-96 (invalidating the "separate-but-equal" doctrine in public
schools). However, the race-based actions that have been taken in the government's postSeptember 11 war on terrorism illustrate that some racial classifications are still permitted. See
supra note 34 (citing articles that discuss similaritjes between present race-based security measures and race-based Japanese internment during World War II).
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through the use of district lines and standardized test scores. Minorities are kept out of predominantly white jobs through the use of
80
standardized test scores and subjective employment standards. Minorities are kept out of predominantly white neighborhoods through
81
the use of zoning restrictions.
Finally, minorities are kept out of
predominantly white legislatures through the use of gerrymandered
voting districts. 82 Accordingly, the use of racial proxies to remedy racial imbalance that itself results from the use of racial proxies seems
congruent enough to constitute a form of poetic justice.
Due to a history of pervasive discrimination against racial minori83
ties, racial minorities are an economically disadvantaged class. That
means that economic disadvantage can now often be used as a proxy
for race in affirmative action programs. Although affirmative action
initiatives based on economic disadvantage will be facially neutral,
they will still have a disproportionately beneficial impact on racial
minorities because racial minorities are overrepresented among
those who suffer economic disadvantage. The Supreme Court is
likely to view economic affirmative action as constitutionally per84
missible precisely because it appears to be facially neutral.
79

See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 366--71 (2003) (Thomas,]., dissenting) (arguing
that law schools could increase diversity by abandoning racially-£orrelated selection criteria
such as the LSAT); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 732-36, 744-47 (1974) (refusing to allow
interdistrict judicial remedies for school segregation, thereby permitting suburban schools to
remain predominantly white and inner-£ity schools to remain overwhelmingly minority).
80
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing statistical disadvantages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in terms of employment); Wards Cove
'Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650 (1989) (explaining why percentile disparities in employment do not necessarily make out a prima facie case of discrimination and adopting stringent standards under Title VII for proof of discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238-48 (1976) (holding that any racially disparate impact resulting from the use of standardized tests in the employment context does not violate the Equal Protection Clause in the absence of intentional discrimination).
81
See, e.g., Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71
(1977) (rejecting claim that residential zoning restriction was racially discriminatory without
any proof that discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
498-508 (1975) (holding that the petitioners did not have standing to challenge zoning ordinance as racially discriminatory without additional evidence of personal impact caused by the
ordinance).
82
See, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 938 (1995) (Ginsburg,]., dissenting) (noting that
Georgia did not send a post-Reconstruction black to Congress until 1972, seven years after the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 676 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that prior to a redistricting plan adopted in response to the
1990 Census, North Carolina had not sent a black representative to Congress since the Reconstruction).
83
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 298-302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing statistical disadvantages that continue to be suffered by racial minorities in terms of wealth and income).
84
Indeed, the Court at times seems to invite the use of economic affirmative action. See, e.g.,
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212-13, 223--24 (1995) (upholding affirmative action for contractors who are socially and economically disadvantaged, but applying strict
scrutiny to statutory presumption that racial minorities are so disadvantaged).
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In a strict doctrinal sense, the use of economic disadvantage as a
proxy for racial disadvantage should not work. The Supreme Court's
85
decision in Washington v. Davis seems clearly to focus on discriminato~ intent as the factor that establishes an equal protection violation.8 As a result, the intent to promote racial balance through the
use of a racial proxy would initially seem to be identical to-and just
as unconstitutional as-the intent to pursue racial balance explicitly.
However, if the Supreme Court were to delve that deeply into the intent of executive or legislative policymakers, even when those policymakers used classifications that were race-neutral on their face, the
Court would be analytically required to delve just as deeply into the
intent lying beneath all of the facially neutral classifications that
American culture presently uses to disadvantage racial minorities with
87
respect to education, employment, housing, and political power.
And that, of course, is something that the Court seems unwilling to
do because of its disruptive effect on the current allocation of re88
sources.
It is also possible to design affirmative action programs that promote racial balance by using proxies that have a higher correlation
with race than does mere economic disadvantage. For example,
things like demonstrated ability to overcome hardship and demonstrated commitment to social justice might be useful proxies for race,
if one believes that racial minorities are particularly likely to possess
those qualities. The racial correlation of such proxies can be further
increased by focusing on factors such as the use of English as a second language, or membership in a family having an incarcerated
parent. 89 Once again, those sorts of proxies are likely to be useful in

426 u.s. 229 (1976).
See id. at 238-48 (holding that programs based on disadvantage, not race, are subject to
relaxed judicial scrutiny, as opposed to racial classifications which mandate strict judicial scrutiny directed at govemmental intent).
87
It is, of course, possible that the Court would find the presence of unconstitutional intent
in a facially neutral affirmative action program, but not in a facially neutral classification that
was intended to promote societal discrimination--even though the two were analytically analogous. Such a tacit distinction may have been what actually motivated the Court's decision in
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), where the Court distinguished between
unconstitutional actuating intent and constitutionally permissible incidental intent. See id. at
278-80 (distinguishing between discriminatory purpose and mere awareness of racially disparate impact). Although Feeney involved allegations of gender discrimination, its elaboration of
the intent requirement is equally applicable to cases of racial discrimination. See id. at 272-73
(discussing racial discrimination as prototype).
88
See, e.g., id. at 278--80 (upholding arguably discriminatory intent that was found to be
merely incidental).
89
See, e.g., Kim Ford-Mazuri, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action,
88 GEO. LJ. 2331, 2332-37 (2000) (stating that some schools promote diversity by considering
essays in which applicants discuss past difficulties and hardships that tend to affect racial minorities).
85

86
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advancing racial balance objectives because they correlate highly with
race. The correlation can be increased even more by focusing on factors such as an individual's experience with overt racial discrimination; an individual's ability to offer perspectives that are typically missing from predominantly white institutions; and the likelihood that an
individual will provide resources to minority communities. 90 As the
racial proxy becomes more transparent, however, the Supreme Court
may be more likely to view its use as an unconstitutional effort to pro91
mote racial balance.
One racial proxy that has ironically gained popularity even among
moderate conservatives is the class rank proxy. Rather than relying
on overt racial affirmative action in educational contexts, class rank
plans automatically admit to state colleges any high school student
who graduates in the top X percent of his or her class. The specified
percentages tend to range from the top 4% to the top 20% of gradu92
ating classes. To the extent that class rank and X-percent proxies
are appealing, it is because they are facially neutral. However, such
programs can promote racial balance onll in states where high
schools are racially segregated to begin with. 9
One of the most noticeable recent uses of racial proxies has been
in the context of voter redistricting. After the 1990 Census created
new congressional seats in states whose past voting discrimination
made them subject to the remedial provisions of the Voting Rights
Act, the Supreme Court began a campaign to oversee the racial politics of congressional redistricting. In Shaw v. Reno, 94 the Court held
that the intentional creation of voting districts in which a majority of
the voters were racial minorities was unconstitutional. 95 Racial majority-minority voting districts are a useful way of promoting racial bal-

90

See, e.g., Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH.
]. RACE & LAw I, 7-10 (2001) (arguing that admissions preferences should be granted on the
basis of such factors).
91
Cf Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (refusing to dismiss a constitutional challenge to a new facially-neutral voting district for the City of Tuskegee, Alabama,
where the shape of the district had been changed from a square to "a strangely irregular twentyeight-sided figure" that excluded virtually all black voters); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
373--74 (1886) (invalidating a conviction for violating a facially-neutral ordinance that required
laundries to be housed in stone or brick buildings, where virtually all who were denied exemptions were Chinese).
92
See Roithmayr, supra note 90, at 10--14 (discussing class rank programs and their mixed
success in aiding racial minorities).
93
See id. at 13 (discussing dependence of class rank plans on segregated nature of high
schools).
94
509 u.s. 630 (1993).
95
See id. at 641-49 (applying strict scrutiny to voting district whose shape was so bizarre that
it could only be explained by racial motivation); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916-17
(1995) (applying strict scrutiny to voting districts where race was a "predominant factor" in
drawing district lines).
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ance because they increase the amount of representation that racial
minorities are able to secure in Congress. When minority voters are
concentrated in minority dominated voting districts, they have a
greater chance of electing a representative who is responsive to their
interests than when minority voters are dispersed throughout white
dominated voting districts.
After having had to resolve a series of cases during the 1990s in
which the Court had to decide whether race had been given too
much weight in drawing district lines, the Court ultimatelr signaled a
retreat from this unwieldy issue. In Easley v. Cromartie, 9 the Court
upheld a gerrymandered voting district with a high concentration of
minority voters on the ground that race had not been used for its
own sake, but rather had been used as a proxy for political party affiliation.97 Accordingly, the Supreme Court now seems to have endorsed the constitutionality of at least this proxy for racial balance,
and it has done so despite the relative transparency of the proxy.
Proxies can mitigate the harshness of the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing. However, they still permit the Supreme
Court to have the final say over the constitutionality of racial policies
that the representative branches seek to implement through use of a
proxy. That suggests that the more effective a racial proxy is in promoting meaningful racial balance, the more likely the Supreme
Court is to invalidate it as a veiled attempt to sidestep the Court's own
racial policy preferences. Perhaps more surreptitious measures are
therefore appropriate.
B. Camouflage

A second way in which the political branches could try to dilute
the force of the Supreme Court's prohibition on racial balancing is
by attempting to camouflage whatever racial balance policies they
choose to adopt. Gruttercontains the Court's most recent articulation
of its longstanding view that the pursuit of racial balance is constitu98
tionally impermissible. However, Grutter itself can be read to support the proposition that well-camouflaged racial balancing is constitutionally permissible. When Grutteris compared to Gratz, 99 it appears
that the Court chose to uphold the affirmative action program that
was more closely connected to racial balance, and to invalidate the
532 u.s. 234 (2001).
See id. at 257-58 (permitting political party affiliation to be used as a proxy for race in the
redistricting context).
98
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (rejecting racial balancing as "patently unconstitutional").
99
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (invalidating the racial affirmative action program at the University of Michigan College of Literature, Science and Arts).
96
97
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program that was less likely to advance that goal. This suggests that
the Supreme Court may ultimately be more interested in form than
in substance with respect to the issue of racial balance.
Grutter upheld the constitutionality of the University of Michigan
100
Law School's affirmative action program.
The Court held that the
Law School had a compelling interest in diversity, which was sufficient to survive the strict equal protection scrutiny that applied to the
school's use of a racial preference for minority students in the admis101
sions process.
The Court also held that the use of a racial "plus"
factor, rather than a numerical quota, was a narrowly tailored way to
advance the school's interest in diversity, and that it satisfied the
equal protection demand that each applicant be given particularized
102
consideration. The Court stressed that such a holistic consideration
helped ensure that each applicant would be treated as an individual
103
rather than merely as a member of a racial group.
On the same day that Grutter was decided, the Supreme Court's
decision in Gratz invalidated the University of Michigan's under104
graduate affirmative action program. Although the goal of increas105
ing student diversity remained compelling, the undergraduate affirmative action program was too mechanical to satisfy the narrow
106
tailoring requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.
Because the
undergraduate program automatically awarded a large fixed number
of points to each minority applicant, it had "the effect of making 'the
factor of race ... decisive' for virtually every minimally qualified un107
derrepresented minority applicant." The failure to use a more particularized selection process, therefore, made the undergraduate
108
program unconstitutional.
Despite the holistic and particularized consideration that the Supreme Court found to be constitutionally essential in Grutter, the Law
School affirmative action program that the Grutter Court upheld appears to have been implemented in a way that was designed to promote racial balance. As ChiefJustice Rehnquist convincingly demonstrated in his Grutter dissent, the percentages of various racial minority groups admitted under the Law School program closely reflected

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 32~0 (upholding a law school affirmative action program that
gave holistic and individualized consideration to applicants).
101
!d. at 328-29.
102
!d. at 333-41.
103
!d. at 337.
104
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
105
I d. at 268.
106
ld. at 270-74.
107
Id. at 272 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 317 ( 1978)) (ellipsis in original).
108
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
100

654

JOURNAL OF CONSTITCJJ10NAL LAW

[Vol. 7:3

the percentages of those same minority groups in the overall Law
109
School applicant pool.
A majority of the admitted minority students were black; half of that number were Latino; and one-sixth of
that initial number were indigenous Indians. The Law School defended its program on the ground that it sought to ensure the admission of a "critical mass" of students from each relevant minority
group, thereby enabling a meaningful exchange of ideas and perspectives among students. However, the low number of Indian students admitted under the program was much too small to constitute a
critical mass. That further supported the conclusion that racial bal110
ance was the actual motive of the Law School program.
Although the undergraduate program was invalidated in Gratz on
the grounds that it mechanically awarded a fixed number of points to
111
each underrepresented minority applicant, there is nothing inherent in the award of a fixed number of points that would necessarily reflect racial balance. Indeed, if the school were primarily interested in
racial balance, it might well prefer a program that awarded a variable
number of points to racial minority group applicants. A variable
point program would enable the school to regulate the number of
points awarded for membership in various minority groups in a way
that enabled the school to achieve more directly whatever racial balance it desired.
What emerges from a comparison of Grutter and Gratz is the possibility that an appropriate degree of camouflage will permit the pursuit of racial balance.
The arguments made by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in his Grutter dissent were cogent enough that the Grutter
majority could not have simply overlooked them. Rather, the majority must have concluded that the Law School program deserved to be
upheld despite that danger that it was motivated by a desire to promote racial balance. Perhaps, the Court preferred the Grutter program to the Gratz program because the fixed numerical bonus in
Gratz simply looked more like a racial quota than the nominally more
particularized racial "plus" in the Grutter holistic program. If that is
true, the Supreme Court may be more concerned with the appearance of affirmative action programs than with their actual effect. As
long as a program appears to be more consistent with liberal conceptions of individual merit than with group-based conceptions of racial
balance, the Court may be willing to uphold the program.

IO!l

Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,381-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).

/d.; see also id. at 340-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Michigan Law School admissions program was really designed to achieve racial balance); id. at 389 (Kennedy,]., dissenting) (explaining that "the concept of critical mass is a de110

lusion used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.").
111
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271-72.
.
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The Court's treatment of the racial redistricting cases supports the
theory that form can be more important than substance in the equal
protection context. As has been noted, after invalidating a number
of majority-minority voting districts during the 1990s on the grounds
that they were predominantly motivated by racial considerations, the
Court upheld what appears to be an analytically indistinguishable majority-minority district on the grounds that it was motivated primarily
by political rather than racial considerations. 112 To the extent that the
Court was willing to relax its opposition to majority-minority voting
districts because it came to view the policy issues that were involved as
essentially political in nature, the Court might be willing to do the
same thing with respect to racial balance. Because a decision by the
political branches to pursue racial balance is also essentially political
in nature, the Court might drop its opposition to such racial balance
if it finds enough camouflage to permit it to do so.
There is an interesting irony in the suggestion that racial balance
might become constitutionally permissible if it is adequately hidden
from view. In order to ensure that an affirmative action program is
not viewed as a program that is facially about racial balance, the program will have to be implemented in a way that ensures that racial
correlations do not become too high. If a program continually admitted percentages of racial minorities that correlated with the percentages of racial minorities in the relevant population, the program
would be easily recognized as a veiled racial balance program. Rather
than use fixed racial quotas, therefore, a program will have to use
floating quotas to ensure that the relevant minority percentages
change periodically.
The need for such floating quotas is ironic for two reasons. First,
the use of a floating quota would require even more consideration of
racial factors than a straight-forward racial balance program. The
program administrators would not only have to ascertain the relevant
racial percentages, as they would with a racial balance program, but
they would then have to monitor the program's performance to make
sure that different racial percentages were produced by the program.
Second, such floating quotas might have to be used even under a
nondiscriminatory program that gave no special consideration to race
at all. In the absence of societal discrimination, one would expect a
nondiscriminatory selection program to reflect the racial minority
percentages that exist in the population at large. If it did not, that
would suggest the presence of discrimination somewhere in the system-either in the choice or the application of selection criteria. In
a truly nondiscriminatory program, underrepresentation of racial mi112

See supra, text accompanying notes 27-39, 94-97 (discussing gerrymandering and voting
district construction in the context of race).
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norities would be expected only if one believed that racial minorities
were somehow inherently inferior to whites in their ability to satisfY
neutral selection criteria. However, since a truly nondiscriminatory
selection program would have the outward appearance of a racial balance program, the results of even a nondiscriminatory program
would have to be adjusted to avoid the appearance of racial balance.
Simply stating that argument suggests that there is something seriously wrong with the Supreme Court's aversion to racial balance.
Proxies and camouflage might successfully permit the political
branches of government to realize some of the benefits of racial balance. However, they would not do much to address the more fundamental separation of powers problems that result from having the
politically unaccountable Supreme Court formulate racial policy for
the nation. In order to address that problem, more direct measures
may be preferable.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The problem with Grutter is not simply that it holds the pursuit of
racial balance to be unconstitutional. What is fundamentally more
troubling is the claim that judicial review authorizes the Supreme
Court to neutralize political solutions to the persistent problem of racial discrimination in the United States. I use the term "neutralize"
because the Court claims to be advancing the cause of race neutrality
when it chooses to override racial balance efforts that are adopted by
the representative branches. But as Part II of this Article sought to
demonstrate,m the concept of neutrality that is used by the Supreme
Court has come to mean merely the continued sacrifice of racial minority interests in order to advance the interests of the white majority.
Regardless of how one feels about the concept of judicial review in
the abstract, this use of judicial review in the context of affirmative
action seems both invidious and indefensible. The problem that
needs to be neutralized is not the effort that the political branches
make to promote racial balance, but rather the conception of judicial
review that the Supreme Court invokes to override such efforts. Fortunately, there are political strategies that the representative branches
of government can use to resist the Court's discriminatory understanding of neutrality. Some strategies can be used in an effort to
persuade the Court to reconsider its own understanding of judicial
review. Other strategies can be used to subvert more directly the
Court's usurpation of racial policymaking power.

m See supra Part II (discussing ways in which the Supreme Court has, in the name of equal
protection, systematically favored the interests of the white majority over the interests of racial
minorities).

Feb. 2005]

NEUTRAliZING GRUITER

657

A. Persuasion
The Supreme Court, of course, responds to politics. It was lonR
1
ago observed that the Supreme Court follows the election returns,
115
and the Court's 5-4 decision in Bush v. Gore has often been cited as
a recent reminder that Supreme Court political preferences can in116
fluence constitutional adjudications in dispositive ways.
It has even
been suggested that the Court's somewhat surprising decision to uphold the affirmative action program at issue in Grutter was heavily influenced by the amicus briefs that the business community, the mili117
tary, and educational leaders filed in the case.
Accordingly, it
makes sense to ask whether there are political actions that can be
taken by the representative branches that might help "convince" the
Court to rethink the intrusiveness with which it exercises judicial review in the context of affirmative action.
One thing that might prompt
Supreme Court to reevaluate its
current conception of judicial review in the affirmative action context
is vocal opposition from the political branches. Historically, several
United States Presidents have been noteworthy for insisting that the
political branches have as much right as the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution. Thomas Jefferson forcefully asserted that the
doctrine of separation of powers did not authorize the Supreme
Court to impose its understanding of the Constitution on the President because each branch of government had an equal right to interpret the Constitution as it applied within that branch's own sphere
118
of authority. Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to recharter the Bank of
the United States with a veto message stating that he believed that the
Bank was unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's de-

the

114

See FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901) ("[N]o matther whether th'
constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns.").
115
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (determining the manner in which F1orida votes should be counted in
the 2000 presidential election).
116
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, llO YALE
LJ. 1407, 1407 (2001) ("It is no secret that the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore has
shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court and in the system of judicial
review.").
117
See, e.g., Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, ll7 HARv. L. REv. 113, ll7 (2003) (describing Grutterand Gratz as "the latest and
perhaps most significant evidence that race-based affirmative action was at risk until the business community, the military brass, and educational leaders rallied in its defense"). I view the
decision as somewhat surprising because it is the first time that Justice O'Connor-who cast the
decisive vote in favor of upholding the plan at issue-has ever voted to uphold a racial affirmative action plan on the merits. See Grutter v. BoUinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311-44 (2003) (majority
opinion of O'Connor,].); THE LAw OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 39, at 160 n.57 (enumerating the affirmative action voting record ofJustice O'Connor).
118
See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 19-20 (14th ed.
2001) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's issuance of pardons for convictions under the Sedition
Act of 1798 even though the courts thought the Act to be constitutional).
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119

CISion in McCulloch v. Maryland upholding the constitutionality of
120
the Bank. President Franklin D. Roosevelt even drafted a speech to
justify his decision to defy an adverse Supreme Court ruling in the
121
Gold Clause Cases if the Court ultimately chose to invalidate the government's abrogation of gold clauses in federal obligations. The
speech was never delivered, however, because the Court's ruling
122
agreed with the President's reading of the Constitution.
All of
these presidential arguments were rooted in the separation-of-powersbased belief that the Court could not properly interfere with the actions of a coordinate branch of government when the coordinate
branch was operating within a sphere of power that had been constitutionally delegated to the political branch rather than to the Court.
In that regard, those presidential assertions of autonomous constitutional interpretation are directly relevant to the claim that the Supreme Court lacks the authority to interfere with the exercise of any
affirmative action policymaking power that the Constitution has delegated to the political branches.
Perhaps the best known example of apparent Supreme Court deference to political pressure stems from President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. Roosevelt threatened to increase the
number of Justices on the Supreme Court in the hope that the plan
would reduce the Supreme Court's opposition to his New Deal efforts
to pull the nation out of the Depression. 12g By focusing the nation's
Depression-related frustrations on the Supreme Court, Roosevelt was
able to offer the public a cause for the nation's continued economic
124
problems.
In addition, by characterizing his plan as a proposal for
structural reform directed at older Justices likely to pose a threat to
judicial efficiency, Roosevelt was able to concentrate political pressure on the Justices whose attachment to older economic theories
made them most antagonistic to his New Deal agenda. 125 The ultimate success of the Court-packing plan suggests that the Supreme
Court may respond to political pressure when the pressure is pervasive, intense, and threatens a prospective dilution of the Court's prestige and policymaking power. Interestingly, in support of his plan,

119

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
See SULLNAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 20-21 (discussing Andrew Jackson's veto message on the bill to recharter the Bank of United States).
121
See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (permitting the government to abrogate
the gold clauses in federal obligations).
122
See SULLNAN & GUI-.'THER, supra note 118, at 22 (referencing Franklin D. Roosevelt's proposed gold clause speech).
123
See id. at 135-37 (discussing Roosevelt's Court-packing plan).
124
See id. at 136 (discussing Roosevelt's effort to blame the Supreme Court for delays in economic recovery following the Great Depression).
125
See id. (discussing Roosevelt's belief that the Supreme Court needed younger blood).
120
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President Roosevelt employed rhetoric that emphasized the importance of preventing the Supreme Court from behaving in an unconstitutional manner:
[W]e have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take
action to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself.
We must find a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the
Constitution itself. We want a Supreme Court which will do justice under
126
the Constitution-not over it.

A President committed to racial equality could make a series of
analogous political speeches that would rebuke the Supreme Court
for impeding the nation's progress toward racial equality through the
Court's overly intrusive judicial review of affirmative action plans. 127
These speeches could emphasize the relative institutional advantages
that the political branches have over the Court in the formulation of
racial policy, especially in light of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 128 but the real point of the speeches would be to send a
political, rather than a doctrinal, message to the Court. The effectiveness of these speeches could be enhanced by echoing three features of President Roosevelt's Court-packing plan. First, the President could blame the Supreme Court for the nation's persistent
racial problems, emphasizing-with appropriate references to Dred
Scott-that the political branches were trying their best to solve the
problem of racial inequality only to have their efforts stymied by a
Court that was pursuing an outmoded conception of equality in
which whites always end up being more equal than racial minorities.
Second, the President could characterize his initiative as a structural
reform that was intended to reestablish separation-of-powers boundaries by confining the Court to adjudicatory rather than policymaking
activities. Third, the President could highlight the fact that the same
four or five Justices voting as a conservative bloc are the ones who always vote against affirmative action and racial balance, thereby highlighting the political, rather than constitutional, nature of the Court's
opposition to majoritarian remedies for racial discrimination. Even a
conservative President with no particular commitment to racial equality should favor sending a strong political admonition to the Court,

126

See id. (quoting President Roosevelt's March 9, 1937 radio address to the nation in which
he called for alterations to the Court).
127
In the past, I have criticized President Clinton for his failure to initiate political actions,
such as those proposed here, to recapture racial policymaking power from the Supreme Court.
See Girardeau A. Spann, Writing Off Race, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467, 469 (2000), available
at http:/ /www.law.duke.edu/journals/63LCPSpann ("What President Clinton has failed to do
is to assert the full scope of his constitutional authority to formulate race relations policy for the
nation that elected him to be its political leader.") (last visited Sept. 28, 2004).
128
See supra Part I.A (discussing the relative institutional competence of the Court and the
political branches).
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because conservatives typically claim that they favor judicial restraint
and disfavor judicial policymaking under the guise of constitutional
129
interpretation -which is precisely what the Supreme Court does
when it invalidates an affirmative action program that has been
adopted by the political branches.
The President and members of Congress could supplement this
political message to the Court in a number of more concrete ways. A
belief in deferential judicial review for benign affirmative action
could be made a political litmus test for the appointment and confirmation of new federal judges, in much the same way that one's position on abortion is often used as a litmus test for judicial appointments.130 In addition, Senators could use their filibuster power to
help ensure that federal judges would not be appointed if they opposed deference to the political branches on the issue of affirmative
.
131
actlon.
Pursuant to the Article III ~ower of Congress to regulate the juris2
diction of the federal courts, the President and members of Congress could propose legislation that would strip the Supreme Court
and lower federal courts of their jurisdiction to review affirmative action programs that were adopted by the representative branches of
government. Politically motivated legislation restricting federal court
jurisdiction has been introduced in the past with respect to a variety
133
of controversial issues.
Although the constitutionality of such legis-

129

For example, in his 2004 State of the Union message, President George W. Bush chastised
activist courts for reading state constitutions to require recognition of same-sex marriages, and
raised the specter of a federal constitutional amendment to reverse those activist decisions. See
State of Gay Unions, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2004, at A18 (quoting Bush as saying, "Activist
judges ... have begun redefining marriage by court order, without regard for the will of the
people and their elected representatives . . . . Ifjudges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon
the people, the only alternative left to the people would be the constitutional. process.") (emphasis in original). Bush later went on to endorse the passage of a constitutional amendment
prohibiting same-sex marriage. See Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Banning Gay Marriage: President Says States Could Rule on Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at
A1 (quoting Bush as saying, "[a]fter more than two centuries of American jurisprudence, and
millennia of human experience, a few judges and local authorities are presuming to change the
most fundamental institution of civilization.").
130
See Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament ofjudges?, 92 CAL. L. REv. 299, 300 (2004)
(citing the abortion litmus test for federal judges).
131
See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardhat~ 37 J. MARsHAll L. REv. 523, 524-29 (2004) (discussing the recent filibuster use by Senate Democrats to defeat politically undesirable Republican nominees to the federal judiciary, largely because of the perceived opposition of those
nominees to civil rights).
132
See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2 (granting Congress the power to create inferior federal
courts and to regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respectively).
133
See RICHARD H. FALLON,JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYsTEM 319-26 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing proposed jurisdiction-stripping legislation
concerning controversial issues such as busing, school prayer, and abortion).
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lation may in some circumstances be uncertain, ~ the point of introducing jurisdiction-stripping legislation in the affirmative action context would be more for its political effect than to secure its actual
adoption.
More forcefully, the President and members of Congress could
propose constitutional amendments that would not only permit the
pursuit of racial balance in the context of affirmative action, but
would also regulate or eliminate judicial review of majoritarian affirmative action. ~ Such an amendment would presumably eliminate
any constitutional difficulties presented by jurisdiction-stripping legislation, but again, the primary motive of introducing such proposed
amendments would be to exert political leverage on the Court. Finally, the President and members of Congress could propose bills of
impeachment directed at Supreme Court Justices who failed to respond to more subtle political messages and continued to violate
separation-of-powers principles by overriding majoritarian affirmative
action programs. ~ The impeachment of President Clinton establishes that such politically motivated use of the impeachment process
can occur even for less lofty purposes. ~
There are a number of ways in which the political branches can
send political messages to the Supreme Court in the hope of having
the Court relax its intrusion into the politically accountable process
of racial policymaking. I suspect that the Court is likely to be responsive to a set of forcefully conveyed political messages, just as it appears
to have been responsive to such messages in the context of the New
Deal Court-packing plan. However, if the Court does not respond to
political pressure, more subversive actions are possible.
1 4

1 5

1 6

1 7

B. Subversion
The Supreme Court can properly expect only the degree of deference to which it is legitimately entitled. When the Court exceeds the
scope of its own constitutional power by usurping policymaking
power from the representative branches, the system of checks and
balances requires that the representative branches resist the Court's
ultra vires actions to the extent that the Constitution gives the political branches the power to do so. If the representative branches can1114

See id. (discussing the constitutionality of jurisdiction-stripping legislation).
See U.S. CONST. art. V (establishing the process for amending the Constitution).
1116
See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Impeachment and Constitutional Structure,
5 WIDENER L. SVMP.]. 249, 256-58 (2000) (discussing the politically motivated impeachment
efforts directed at Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren and Supreme Court Associate Justice William 0. Douglas).
'" See id. (discussing the politically motivated impeachment effort directed at President Bill
Clinton).
135
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not find ways to persuade the Supreme Court to adopt a more deferential approach to judicial review in the context of affirmative action,
the representative branches should find ways to subvert the Court's
efforts to upset the constitutional balance of powers.
The idea that subversion can be a legitimate response to an ille138
gitimate legal order is not a new one.
However, the idea has been
given new vitality by Professor Paul Butler. Butler has argued, for example, that jury nullification can constitute an appropriate response
by racial minority jurors to the forms of racial discrimination that are
built into the criminal justice system. 139 He has also argued that it is
praiseworthy for judges to circumvent a law that they believe to be im140
moral.
Butler is careful to limit his support of subversion to questions of morality, as opposed to mere political disagreements. 141 I am
advocating subversion by the political branches, directed at the manner in which the Supreme Court has exercised judicial review under
the Equal Protection Clause, because I believe the Supreme Court's
actions to be unconstitutional, illegitimate, and immoral. I believe
this because the Supreme Court's racial jurisprudence has a proven
142
propensity to promote racial injustice.
Political subversion of Supreme Court decisions can be effective,
as the aftermath of the Brown decisions demonstrates. 143 The massive
resistance that followed the Supreme Court's desegregation decision
was successful in delaying any meaningful desegregation of southern
144
schools for a decade.
Presumably, that is because the Court so
18

The founding of the United States was premised on the belief that subversion is a legitimate response to an illegitimate legal order. See JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS AMENDMENTS 6 (3d ed. 2001) (citing THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776), declaring that "whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.").
189
Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal justice System, 105
YALE LJ. 677, 678 (1995).
140
See Paul Butler, Subversive judges (Oct. 24, 2003) (unpublished manuscript delivered at
Georgetown-Sloan Interdisciplinary Workshop, on file with author).
141
See, e.g., id. at 13 n.36 (stating that "disagreement with the law on public policy groundsas opposed to moral grounds-does not justify subversion").
14
See generally RACE AGAINST THE COURT, supra note 7, at 85-169 (discussing the ways in
which the Supreme Court has historically sacrificed racial minority interests to advance the interests of the white majority).
143
Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 493-96 (1954) (invalidating the separate-but-equal doctrine in public schools); see also Brown II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) requiring desegregation of public schools
"with all deliberate speed.").
144
See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 456-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's response to
massive southern resistance following the Brown decisions). Although I have suggested that the
Supreme Court responds to political pressure, both Brawn I and II and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S.
1, 18-21 (1958) (insisting on desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas
despite massive resistance), are often cited to illustrate the Supreme Court's capacity for judicial
"
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feared the political backlash that followed the issuance of Brown I, 145
that it felt compelled to retreat to the "all deliberate speed" formula
146
of Brown Il.
This was a means of delaying implementation of the
147
Court's desegregation requirement.
Moreover, the year after Brown
I was decided, the post-Brown threat of massive southern resistance
caused the United States Supreme Court to back down from a political confrontation with the Virginia Supreme Court over the issue of
miscegenation. In its infamous Naim v. Naim 148 decisions, the Court
refused to invalidate a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been
defiantly upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, even though Brown I
seemed to have made miscegenation laws clearly unconstitutional. 149
Perhaps similar massive resistance to the Supreme Court's intrusive
judicial review of affirmative action would be similarly successful in
marginalizing Supreme Court efforts to override the affirmative action policies adopted by the representative branches. And, of course,
there is something appealingly symmetrical about using the a technique to promote racial equality that is the same as the technique

independence. However, that characterization is inaccurate. Cooper constituted the only effort
by the Supreme Court to enforce the desegregation mandate of the Brown decisions prior to
1963. Moreover, the bulk of southem school desegregation that followed resulted not from
Supreme Court decisions, but from the political actions of Congress in passing the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the political actions of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in
enforcing that Act. STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 457-58.
145
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
146
See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (requiring the district courts to take actions towards desegregation "with all deliberate speed.").
147
See STONE ET AL., supra note 7, at 455-60 (discussing the Supreme Court's delay in implementing its Brown desegregation requirement).
148
350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam); 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam).
149
In Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam), and 350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court was asked to hold unconstitutional a Virginia miscegenation statute that had been upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. The United
States Supreme Court vacated the Virginia decision and remanded for clarification of the record. 350 U.S. at 891. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, however, merely reaffirmed its
earlier decision and refused to clarify the record. Nairn v. Nairn, 90 S.E.2d 849,850 (1956) (per
curiam). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court declined to recall or amend the mandate, finding that the constitutional question had not been "properly presented." This allowed
the Virginia court's decision to remain in effect. 350 U.S. at 985. Because the neutrality principle that had been announced in Brown I seemed to make the Virginia miscegenation statute
unconstitutional, and because the Supreme Court's failure to resolve Naim on the merits also
seemed to violate a federal statute giving the Supreme Court mandatory jurisdiction over the
case, the Supreme Court's actions in Naim v. Naim have been vigorously criticized. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Vinues "-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1964) (noting that "there are very few dismissals similarly
indefensible in law."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 34 (1959) (noting that dismissal of the miscegenation case was "wholly without basis
in the law."). The Supreme Court ultimately invalidated the Virginia miscegenation statute
eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), when only 16 states still had
miscegenation statutes on the books. !d. at 6.
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previously used by southern segregationists to promote racial discrimination.
The political branches can subvert the Supreme Court's illegitimate exercise of judicial review in the context of affirmative action by
aggressively utilizing the full scope of the power that the Constitution
grants to the political branches. I have suggested that the political
branches could introduce jurisdiction-stripping legislation, constitutional amendments, and bills of impeachment in an effort to pressure
the Supreme Court into changing its conception of appropriate judicial review. But the political branches need not stop at the mere introduction of such measures. If the Supreme Court does not respond
to political pressure, the political branches also have the constitutional authority to implement those remedies. Congress could actually pass jurisdiction-stripping legislation that insulated affirmative action from judicial review. The states could actually amend the
Constitution in a way that made affirmative action unambiguously
constitutional. And recalcitrantJustices could actually be removed from
office by impeachment.
There is little doubt that the political branches have the explicit
authority to take such actions. However, it is equally clear that the
use of such extreme measures as an antidote to Supreme Court appropriations of legislative or executive policymaking power seems inconsistent with existing conventions about the proper use of those
constitutional powers. But existing constitutional conventions can be
changed.
Professor Mark Tushnet describes a political phenomenon that he
calls constitutional hardball, in which political players seek to combine
rhetoric and action in wars that alter pre-existing understandings of
the constitutional order. 15 Tushnet offers three examples. The first
is the aggressive use of the filibuster by Senate Democrats to block
the confirmation of George W. Bush's more conservative judicial
nominees, and the Republican rejoinder that such use of the filibuster has interfered with the President's constitutional power to
make judicial appointments. The second example is the effort by Republican majorities in Colorado and Texas to redraw voting district
lines in ways that would perpetuate Republican control of the legislature, and the ensuing decision of Texas Democrats to resist that effort by absenting themselves from both the legislature, and the State of
Texas, in order to ensure the absence of a legislative quorum. The
third example is the Republican impeachment of President Clinton
in the House of Representatives despite the absence of a reasonable
likelihood that a Senate conviction would follow. All of these actions
150

Tushnet, supra note 131. See generaUy MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
1-8 (2003) (describing Tushnet's concept of a new constitutional order).
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were authorized by the letter of the Constitution, but all seemed to
violate pre-existing conventions about what sorts of actions were constitutionally appropriate under what circumstances.
Nevertheless, the political players in each instance were willing to
risk violating existing constitutional norms because they believed the
stakes of the underlying political debate to be very high, and because
151
they wished to establish a new constitutional order.
In the context
of affirmative action, the political branches could-with great ceremony-use the jurisdiction-stripping power, the amendment power,
and the impeachment power in an unconventional manner precisely
to establish a new constitutional understanding about the proper allocation of racial policymaking power between the political branches
and the Supreme Court.
There is another way to play constitutional hardball in the context of
affirmative action. The representative branches could adopt an aggressive interpretation of the Article III restrictions on the scope of
federal judicial power that were created by the Supreme Court itself.
Article III limits the judicial power to "[c]ases" and
152
"[c]ontroversies."
Under the prevailing model of federal adjudication that emanates from john Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madi153
son, that restriction has come to mean that the federal courtsincluding the Supreme Court-are limited to retrospectively resolving concrete disputes between adversary parties, and are not institutionally competent to render advisory opinions that are prospective
154
or legislative in nature.
In reality, it has always been so common for
the Supreme Court to issue opinions designed to have a prospective
effect on the resolution of controversial policy issues that its resolution of the dispute between the particular parties is typically viewed as
155
incidental at best.
However, the political branches have the power to create a new
constitutional order in which the Marbury-based separation-of-powers
limitation on federal court jurisdiction is actually taken seriously.
The political branches could treat Supreme Court adjudications as
binding on the parties before the Court, but not as creating prospec151

See id. at 8-13 (outlining the challenges that politicians must overcome to establish a new
constitutional regime).
152
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
153
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-80 (1803) (setting the foundation for judicial review).
154
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 133, at 67-90 (discussing how the case or controversy requirement is traceable to the model of adjudication advanced by Chief justice Marshall in Marbury).
155

For example, it is difficult to imagine that Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was really about
whether Linda Brown could attend an integrated school. Similarly, it is difficult to imagine that
Marbury itself was really about whether William Marbury could get an official piece of paper
naming him a justice of the peace. Both cases were obviously intended to establish broad, prospective principles oflaw relating to racial segregation and judicial review, respectively.
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tive legislative-type rules of constitutional law. In the new constitutional order, Supreme Court precedents would be narrowly construed so that they did not control future cases involving different
parties and different fact situations.
Ironically, this approach would have the effect of making Supreme Court opinions advisory to the political bodies. Supreme
Court opinions would resolve the particular disputes that were before
the Court, but they would have a prospective effect on legislative and
executive policymakers only to the extent that those policymakers
found the Supreme Court opinions ~ersuasive enough to incorporate
56
into their own policymaking actions.
The new understanding of judicial review that I am advocating is
not unprecedented. I think it is what Thomas Jefferson and Andrew
Jackson had in mind when they argued that Supreme Court adjudications were not binding on the political branches of government when
the political branches were acting within their own spheres of consti157
tutional authority.
Moreover, my view is simply an extension of the
view expressed by Abraham Lincoln in the aftermath of Dred Scott.
Lincoln insisted that Supreme Court precedents should be read as
binding in the cases from which they emanated, but should not be
viewed as establishing political rules to govern the coordinate
branches or the voters. For Lincoln, political resistance to a Supreme
Court rule that the voters or the political branches viewed as erroneous was important as a means for the getting the Supreme Court to
158
reverse its disfavored rule.
And, of course, there is always the option of outright defiance. In
response to a Supreme Court decision concerning Indian sovereignty
with which President Andrew Jackson strongly disagreed, Jackson is
reputed to have said: 'john Marshall has made his decision. Now let
159
him enforce it."
As has been noted, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was also prepared to defy an adverse Supreme Court decision in

156

This is ironic because the gist of the Marbury model of adjudication is that Article III
courts do not have the authority to issue advisory opinions. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 133, at
78-85 (discussing advisory opinions).
157
See supra text accompanying notes 118-20 (describing the views of Thomas Jefferson and
Andrew Jackson on the deference owed to Supreme Court adjudications).
158
See SULLNAN & GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 21 (discussing the views of Abraham Lincoln
on the deference owed to Supreme Court a<ljudications).
159
See id. at 23 (discussing Andrew Jackson's reaction to the Supreme Court decision in
Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). In fact, the pertinent litigation was abandoned
before a confrontation between Jackson and the Court came to a head. See SULLNAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 118, at 23 ("[T]he litigation was abandoned before any call for presidential assistance arose."); see aLso Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969) (discussing Indian cases that created tension between
Jackson and the Supreme Court); RICHARD H. CHUSED, CAsES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN
PROPERlY 20-35 (1999) (describing the Indian cases and Jackson's response).
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the Gold Clause Cases if the need to do so had arisen.
And the Virginia Supreme Court did successfully defy the United States Supreme
Court in the Naim v. Naim litigation, when the United States Supreme
Court chose to back down rather than confront the Virginia Supreme
161
Court over the issue of miscegenation.
If all else fails, simple defiance might be the most appropriate response to continued Supreme
Court efforts to override racial policy determinations made by the
representative branches. Mter all, we did fight a Civil War in re162
sponse to Dred Scott.
CONCLUSION

I have argued that the Supreme Court lacks the relative institutional competence under our constitutional system of separated governmental powers to substitute its policy preferences for the policy
determinations made by the politically accountable branches of government concerning how best to implement the equal protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. I have also argued that
the Supreme Court's long history of sacrificing racial minority interests for the benefit of the white majority disqualifies the Court both
from exercising intrusive judicial review over majoritarian affirmative
action programs adopted to benefit racial minorities, and from reading the Constitution to preclude the representative branches from
pursuing racial balance remedies for the persistent problem of racial
discrimination. I have, therefore, urged the political branches to
sidestep the Supreme Court's troublesome affirmative action decisions to the extent that they are able to do so through the use of
proxies and camouflage techniques. If such creative compliance efforts prove unsuccessful, I have encouraged the political branches to
utilize the full scope of their constitutional powers to persuade the
Supreme Court to reconsider its present conception of judicial review
in the affirmative action context. If persuasion fails, I have argued
that the political branches have a constitutional obligation to exercise
their constitutional powers in ways that will subvert the Court's usurpation of racial policymaking power, even if such subversion ultimately comes to encompass outright defiance of Supreme Court decisions. To the extent that my position strikes you as extreme, please
consider that to be a measure of how strongly I feel about an issue
that I consider to be more moral than doctrinal.

160

See supra text accompanying notes 121-22 (discussing speech prepared by Franklin D.
Roosevelt to defY the Supreme Court ruling in Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), if an
adverse decision had been handed down).
161
See supra note 149 (describing the Naim v. Naim litigation).
162
See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 (discussing Dred Scott and the Civil War).
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I antiCipate that my subversive advocacy will be met with the
charge that I am essentially promoting lawlessness. I suspect that I
will be accused of impatiently placing my parochial short-term interest in racial equality ahead of the nation's more important long-term
goal of maintaining a stable form of government in which the Supreme Court retains the legitimacy needed to operate as the primary
guardian of our individual rights. And I imagine that I will ultimately
be charged with naivete for my belief that the majoritarian political
process could ultimately end up being more protective of racial minority rights than the Supreme Court is likely to be.
My response to the charge of lawlessness is that I am trying to
remedy what I perceive to be the lawlessness of the present regime, in
which the Supreme Court has been permitted to exceed the scope of
its constitutional authority in ways that repeatedly harm the interests
of racial minorities. My response to the charge of impatient parochialism is that I can conceive of few principles as universal as the equality principle that prohibits invidious discrimination, and that racial
minorities have waited long enough for that principle to be honored
in the United States. My response to the charge of naivete is that I
am not so much naive as hopeful. My hope is that the majoritarian
political branches, supported by the majoritarian electorate, will do
more to promote the cause of racial equality if they are no longer
constrained by the discriminatory proclivities that have been exhibited by the Supreme Court throughout its history. How far the culture will go is likely be a direct function of how much the culture cares about racial justice. I may ultimately turn out to be wrong in
placing my hope in the process of representative democracy. But, for
the moment at least, it seems better than the alternative.

